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As Iran
faces international pressure over its nuclear program, Tehran is growing increasingly concerned by
the internal threat posed by a resurgent Kurdish national movement led by the
Party for Freedom and Life in Kurdistan (PJAK). In 2005, according to the
Iranian government, PJAK killed at least 120 Iranian soldiers in Iran. In
2006, PJAK may exceed this total. Already, it has launched dozens of attacks
both from its camps in Iraqi Kurdistan and from its underground cells in Iran itself. In
one of its latest attacks, PJAK troops killed four Iranian soldiers on May 27
in a clash near the town of Mako in Iranian Kurdistan, the PKK's Roj TV reported. PJAK,
however, regards its military operations as merely complementing its wider
effort to build a new Kurdish national identity among the four million Kurds
who make up seven percent of Iran's
population. PJAK has around 3,000 troops based in northern Iraq, but claims tens of thousands of
activists working inside Iran
to promote a Kurdish identity, democracy and women's rights [1].
As the confrontation between Iran
and the West escalates, international attention has increasingly focused on Tehran's internal
vulnerability. In particular, analysts point out that Iran's "imperial" past has resulted
in ethnic Persians—who make up scarcely half of Iran's 80 million people—holding
disproportionate power, wealth and influence. If the crisis with Iran escalates further, Iran's
neglected and often resentful Kurdish, Azeri and Arab minorities may
increasingly play a key role in global events. At the forefront will likely
be Iran's Kurds, and chief
among them PJAK, which for nearly a decade has worked to replace Iran's
theocratic government with a federal and democratic system, respectful of
human rights, sexual equality and freedom of expression.
History of PJAK
The exact history of PJAK is widely disputed. Turkey
and Iran
claim that PJAK is no more than an off-shoot of the Kurdistan Workers' Party
(PKK). According to founding members of PJAK, however, the group began in Iran around 1997
as an entirely peaceful student-based human rights movement [2]. The group
was inspired by the success of Iraq's
Kurdish autonomous region and by the PKK's struggle
in Turkey.
Discouraged by the failure of previous Kurdish revolts, however, PJAK's leaders initially worked only to maintain and
build a Kurdish national identity and to thwart the Iranian government's
attempts to re-brand Iranian Kurds as ethnic Persians or Aryans.
After a series of government crackdowns against Kurdish activists and intellectuals,
the group's leadership moved to the safety of Iraqi Kurdistan in 1999. Here
they settled in the area controlled by the PKK on the slopes of Mount Qandil—less
than 10 miles from the Iranian border [3]. Once established at Qandil, PJAK adopted many of the political ideas and
military strategies of jailed PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan,
whose theories had initially inspired PJAK's
founders while still in Iran.
The PKK's ideological influence also transformed
PJAK from a civil rights movement to a more ambitious and multi-directional
independence movement, aided by the transfer of many seasoned PKK fighters of
Iranian origin into PJAK [4].
Ideology
Since then, PJAK has adopted many aspects of Abdullah Ocalan's
ideology, particularly his renunciation of his earlier communist ideologies
in favor of democratic liberalism and his belief that civil activists need to
be defended by military "cadres." Yet, PJAK retains many traces of
its origins as a non-violent student movement. PJAK operates "according
to the rules of war," according to Akif Zagros, a member of PJAK's
seven member leadership council [5]. This claim has been reluctantly endorsed
by the Iranian government; although it describes PJAK as a "terrorist
group," it has never accused them of attacking civilians. While PJAK's leaders have twice kidnapped groups of Iranian
soldiers in 2003 and 2004, in both instances they were released unharmed
after being tried and acquitted for crimes against the Kurdish people by ad
hoc PJAK courts in Iranian Kurdistan.
Equally, PJAK's vision is less radical than the PKK's. PJAK does not openly promote the creation of a
single independent Kurdish state. Instead, they favor replacing Iran's velayat-e-faqih (rule by the jurisprudent) system of
clerical government with a democratic and highly federalized system which
would effectively grant self-rule not only to Kurds, but also to Azeri, Baloch and Arab regions. Privately, however, since PJAK
itself is not exclusively composed of Iranian Kurds and contains Kurds from as
far away as Russia, many PJAK members hope for the amalgamation of all
Kurdish areas into a single fully independent Kurdish republic.
Yet, perhaps the most striking aspect of PJAK's
agenda is their call for the emancipation of women from Islamic law and
Middle Eastern cultural norms. Ms. Gulistan Dugan,
36, head of Yerjerika, PJAK's
women's branch founded two years ago, says that "45 percent of PJAK are
women" and adds that "the daughters of our movement play a part in
all our operations. There are many military operations that women have taken
part in" [6]. PJAK sees women's freedom as a core part of a Kurdish
identity and point to the relative equality enjoyed by Kurdish women
historically. At the same time, the issue also usefully affirms their commitment
to a modern, liberal and democratic government, while also underscoring their
ideological, political and cultural opposition to Tehran.
Strategy
PJAK activists are inspired by Cold War socialist revolutions, Iran's own
1979 revolution and the experiences of Iraqi and Turkish Kurds. Akif Zagros describes the
group's tactics as follows: "The first stage is to spread our ideas
amongst the people, especially among women, students and businessmen." He
continues, saying that the "second stage is to organize people
underground in schools, universities and in civil society" [7].
As the movement developed, however, the Iranian government reacted with
increasingly heavy-handed crackdowns. In response, according to Zagros, "we formed a military force to protect
ourselves and protect our movement. The rule of our party is to avenge the
blood of our marytrs" [8]. The group's first
armed attack took place in 2004 in the Meriwan
region of Iranian Kurdistan after Iranian security forces fired on a Kurdish
demonstration killing 10 people. This, however, did not mark an overall
change of strategy toward military confrontation.
Military Operations
Although PJAK regularly engages Iranian troops, the group's attacks are not
intended to defeat Iran
militarily, but instead to complement and protect PJAK's
political activists. In addition, the attacks aim to reinforce Kurdish
national pride and to explicitly avenge the death of Kurdish activists and
civilians. Ideally, PJAK would like to be strong enough to deter any crackdown
against Kurdish civil activists by the Iranian authorities.
PJAK has adopted hit-and-run assault tactics against Iranian forces, carrying
them out with "small arms and grenades," according to Zagros. Afterward, PJAK fighters may either melt back
into Iranian society or re-cross the border into Iraqi Kurdistan. PJAK is
believed to have some heavier weaponry in its Mount Qandil
camp such as RPGs and heavy machine-guns [9]. PJAK's military operations are believed to be funded by
Kurdish immigrant communities in Europe and Kurdish businessmen in Iran. Despite
Iranian accusations, there is no evidence of any foreign funding.
Escalation
During early 2006, a cycle of Kurdish demonstrations, Iranian repression and
Kurdish counterattacks developed in Iranian Kurdistan. This peaked in
February when 10 Kurdish demonstrators were killed by police in the city of Maku.
PJAK responded with "three attacks against two [Iranian] bases,"
says Zagros [10]. Shortly afterward, on April 21, and again a week later, Iranian troops fired nearly
100 artillery shells at PJAK positions near Mount Qandil
and briefly crossed the Iraqi border, according to the Iraqi Ministry of
Defense. "In the second violation, there was bombing against the
positions of the PKK," Major-General Abd al-Aziz Muhammad, director of the joint operation center in
the Iraqi Ministry of Defense told al-Jazeera,
incorrectly assuming that PKK and not PJAK bases had been attacked. "The
Iranian troops reached five kilometers into Iraqi territory before they
withdrew" (al-Jazeera, May 3).
The Iranian attack is believed to have killed no more than 10 PJAK fighters,
but it sent out a clear message that PJAK's camp
was not invulnerable. The U.S.
and Kurdish governments barely
responded. "If those reports are true, I would expect that the Iraqi
government would have something to say to the Iranian government," U.S.
State Department spokesman Sean McCormack told a May 1 press conference when
asked about the raid.
PJAK and the PKK
One reason for the failure of the U.S.,
Iraqi or even the Kurdish governments to take action against Iran's April
border incursion is the close relationship between PJAK and the PKK. Both
Iraqis and Kurds believe the PKK presence in northern Iraq damages ties with Turkey, Iraq's best armed and most
economically advanced neighbor.
Although PJAK is administratively, military and politically separate from the
PKK, links remain. PJAK uses some PKK facilities—such as hospitals—and remain
based inside the PKK's defensive perimeter on Mount Qandil. Additionally,
the two groups evidently share common goals [11]. Of course, if PJAK's links with the PKK damages its standing in the
West, the close relationship has other advantages. As well as benefiting from
the PKK's military expertise, a close relationship
also wins PJAK instant respect among the region's Kurds. Nevertheless, PJAK's failure to engage with Western governments or
media means that Iran
has successfully sown confusion by referring to PJAK attacks as being carried
out by the PKK.
Conclusion
PJAK has taken a long-term approach. Its core strategy is to promote Kurdish
identity and to fight only in order to defend and avenge its civil activists.
PJAK's leaders believe that if they can prevent
Kurds from losing their ethnic and historic identity, then there will someday
be a chance for Kurds to break free from Tehran's rule. Today, however, PJAK's followers believe that a historic opportunity is
fast approaching. They point out that civil and insurgent Kurdish groups in Turkey are again vibrant and that Turkey's
response is constrained by its ambitions to join the European Union. At the
same time, Iraqi Kurds have consolidated their position while anti-Kurdish
governments in Iran and Syria are
under increasing international scrutiny and pressure. In addition, Kurds,
including PJAK, after re-branding themselves as opponents of political Islam
and partisans of human rights, women's rights and democracy, are
well-positioned to ride out coming geopolitical shifts in the Middle East and
any fragmentation of Middle Eastern states.
PJAK's independent and non-state sources of funding
and well-established underground network means that Iran will
struggle to defeat either PJAK or the Kurdish nationalism it fosters. Yet,
given Iran's
proven ability to absorb massive casualties, PJAK's
ambitions to create a military balance of power and deter future Iranian
crackdowns on PJAK activists seem optimistic. In addition, Iran recently
adopted the successful Turkish system of employing rural Kurds as "village
guards" in an attempt to force PJAK into fighting its own people. Since
most PJAK attacks occur in cities, however, this tactic may fail, especially
if Iran
does not address wider Kurdish grievances through either investment or
political reforms.
While PJAK lacks Western support, this has made the group self-reliant,
flexible and open to compromise. For instance, PJAK currently talks mainly of
reforming Iran's
political system and aims to "create a coalition of all democratic and
Kurdish parties," according to Zagros. If PJAK
can succeed in creating a broader movement, then they might reach a position
to challenge Tehran.
In particular, PJAK regards Iran's
20 million Azeris as natural allies against Tehran, despite the
fact that many Azeris hold key posts in the Islamic
regime. In recent weeks, this strategy has become more plausible after the Azeris of Eastern Iran held widespread demonstrations
after a Persian cartoonist compared them to cockroaches—perhaps hinting at
deeper underlying tensions within Iran. In the meantime, however,
as long as Iranian Kurds continue to consider themselves Kurds, rather than
Persians or Iranians, then PJAK will consider itself successful.
Notes
1. Akif Zagros, member of
PJAK leadership council, interview with author, PJAK Camp, Mount Qandil,
Iraqi Kurdistan, March 21.
2. Akif Zagros and Gulistan Dugan, members of PJAK leadership council,
interview with author, PJAK Camp, Mount
Qandil,
Iraqi Kurdistan, March 21.
3. Zagros, March 21.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
6. Dugan, March 21.
7. Zagros, March 21.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid. Allegations of heavier weaponry come from photographs on PJAK's website PJAK.com and Max Chamka's
article "PJAK, the unknown entity of the Kurdish resistance in
Iran," http://www.caucaz.com/home_eng/breve_contenu.php?id=183, August
31, 2005.
10. Zagros, March 21.
11. Assad Abdul Rahman Chaderchi, member of PKK leadership council, interview
with author, PKK base camp, Mount
Qandil,
Iraqi Kurdistan, March 22.
Source: James Brandon, The James Town Foundation, June 15, 2006, Volume 4,
Issue 12
Kurdish Media
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