Von: Internationales Rettungskomitte für IranerInnen
Tel. 01 4034755
E-Mail : email@example.com
Reg. Nr. III-2254
An : Sicherheitsdirektion Wien
Landesamt für Verfassungsschutz und Terrorismusbekämpfung
Herr Chefinspektor Helmut Birgfellner
Betrifft : Warnung
Sehr geehrter Herr Chefinspektor,
Wir haben erfahren, dass Herr Dr. Assar
Alireza, ein iranischer Physiker, der bei uns als anerkannter politischer
Flüchtling in Wien wohnt, vor kurzem einen Teil der geheimen Atomprogramme der
Mullahs bei verschiedenen internationalen Pressekonferenzen und Interviews in
Öffentlichkeit gebracht hat. Seitdem wurde er mehrmals lebensgefährlich
bedroht. Die Agenten von Mullahs Regime Irans haben auch seine Familie
belästigt und bedroht. Der Iranische Geheimdienst und der Informationsminister
hat Vorwürfe gegenüber ihn geäußert und ihn als israelischer Spion bezeichnet.
Nicht nur er sondern auch die Medien der Mullahs im In- und Ausland verbreiten
Vorwürfe und unwahre Geschichten gegen ihn. Die Terroristischen Aktivitäten des
Regimes der Mullahs außerhalb der iranischen Grenze (über 500 terroristische
Operationen)haben uns und auch euch (manchmal) beigebracht, dass jede Warnung
und Bedrohung von den Agenten des Regimes der Mullahs ernstgenommen werden
müssen. Wie sie wissen ist der Staatspräsident der Mullahs selbst ein
Terrorist, welcher in Wien am Mord dreier Kurden beteiligt war. Sein
Regierungskabinett ist ein militärisches Kabinett mit gesamt 21 Ministerien,
die vorgeschlagen haben 18 Personen entweder bei der Revolutionsgarde( „ Sepah Ghods „ spezielle Einheiten
für terroristische Aktivitäten außerhalb der iranischen Grenze) oder Mitglied
beim iranischen Geheimdienst sind. Vorherige Woche laut der kurdischen
demokratischen Partei Iran ist ein Mitglied
dieser Partei in Schweden auf offener Strasse durch 3 unbekannte Täter
Dr. Assar fühlt sich zurzeit nicht in Sicherheit.
Wir bitten Sie daher die Warnung der terroristischen Agenten der Mullahs ernst
zu nehmen, bevor was unerfreuliches passiert. Herr Dr. Assar
ist ein sehr wichtiger Zeuge und verlangt somit das Zeugenschutzprogramm.
Wir bitten Sie ganz höflich im Namen der Freiheit und der österreichischen
Verfassung Herrn Dr. Assar seine bürgerrechtlichen
Schutz zu gewährleisten. Dr. Assar ist anerkannter
politischer Flüchtling und befindet sich im Schutz im Sinne der Genfer
Konvention. Herr Dr. Assar ist ein wichtiger Zeuge
und sollte im Schutz des österreichischen Staates sein.
Wir bitten um Kenntnisnahme,
Mit freundlichen Grüßen,
Seyed Yoosef Mojab
Beilage 2 Interview
“Iran is close to a nuclear bomb”: Iranian
scientist Wed. 13 Jul 2005
Face to Face
An interview with a defector from Iran’s secretive nuclear establishment
Paris, Jul. 13 - Alireza Assar received his
Master of Science degree in high energy physics and elementary particles from
the University of St. Andrews in Scotland in 1977, his PhD in mathematics
from the University of Vienna, and studied theoretical physics at the
prestigious International Centre for Theoretical Physics in Trieste, Italy.
He was a professor of physics in Shahid Bahonar University in Kerman (southern Iran) and acted as a Ministry of Defence consultant on Iran's nuclear programme
until the early 1990s. He left Iran in 1992, but has maintained
contact with his friends and fellow scientists in the country.
Iran Focus: Many suspect Iran of secretly running a nuclear
weapons programme. Iran says its nuclear programme is for entirely peaceful purposes. What is the
Assar: There are two parallel nuclear
programmes in Iran. The one run by the Atomic Energy
Organization of Iran (AEOI) is centred on the light
water reactor in Bushehr. Ostensibly, this plant
was designed to generate electricity. But the Iranian regime has developed a
vast uranium enrichment programme that was hidden
from the outside world until 2002, when the National Council of Resistance of
Iran first exposed it. This is the military programme
that was designed to produce enough highly enriched uranium to enable the
regime to produce nuclear weapons. I know for certain that this programme has been in operation for at least 18 years,
and it has been under the control of the Revolutionary Guards and the
Ministry of Defence, completely separated from the
AEOI. There are many experts in AEOI who have no information about the
Q: Iran’s Foreign Minister said recently
that Iran has a rapidly growing population and needs
nuclear power to produce electricity.
A: It’s an insult to intelligence to say that a regime that was hiding
a vast uranium enrichment programme and other
critical aspects of its nuclear project from the international community for
18 years was trying to produce electricity.
Q: How did you become involved in the military side of the nuclear programme?
A: They came to me. When I was teaching in the University of Kerman,
the Revolutionary Guards invited me in 1985 to cooperate with them on a
nuclear project. I even had two meetings in 1987 and 1988 with then-Commander
in Chief of the Revolutionary Guards, Mohsen Rezai [now the secretary general of the State Expediency
Council], who came with two of his senior commanders to Kerman for these
meetings. We met in the office of the governor of Kerman. They were
interested in neutron triggers for nuclear explosion. I suggested that the
research would be cost-prohibitive. They said how much do you have in mind? I
said, 100 million dollars. Rezai smiled and said,
“We had allocated 800 million dollars to this. Go ahead”. This and other
conversations with the top commanders of the Revolutionary Guards proved to
me that they were after the nuclear bomb and that this was a state policy.
Could commanders of the Revolutionary Guards act just on their own and dole
out 800-million-dollar budgets? No way.
Q: Were you alone in those meetings?
A: No. There were two other nuclear scientists, Alireza
Bahrampour and Mohammad Bolourizadeh.
Both of them worked for the Ministry of Defence. Bahrampour focused on the use of laser technology in
missile guidance systems. The Revolutionary Guards have for long been
studying the problems associated with delivery of nuclear weapons. The actual
production of a crude nuclear bomb was not such a big challenge, but to make
a bomb light enough and small enough to fit into the warhead of a missile was
a much bigger challenge. They have been working on that for years.
Q: How soon will they have the bomb?
A: As a physicist with a lot of experience and contacts inside Iran’s nuclear establishment, I have
no doubt in my mind that the regime in Tehran is not far from the nuclear bomb.
They have the precursors they need, so it’s a matter of engineering and time.
We mustn’t have any illusions. The current leadership in Tehran sees nuclear weapons as an
indispensable part of its strategy.
Q: How does the arrival of the new ultra-conservative President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad change
A: You have to understand that the nuclear weapons programme
is the exclusive fief of the Revolutionary Guards. Now that you have at the
head of the executive branch a former commander of the Revolutionary Guards
with a track record as the one Ahmadinejad has, the
nuclear weapons programme will receive a great
boost. They will be able to make use of all the resources of the state
without worrying about other internal factions. So Ahmadinejad’s
arrival is going to make the nuclear clock in Iran tick faster. He is an obedient
disciple of [Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali] Khamenei,
so the nuclear talks [with the Europeans] will certainly get to nowhere.
Q: There is a big row over the question of uranium enrichment. The U.S. position is that Iran must abandon enrichment
altogether. The British and the Germans agree, but France seems to be willing to allow a
degree of enrichment to continue. How do you see this?
A: It’ll be a disaster to allow the Iranian regime to continue any
enrichment programme. Why does the regime insist on
keeping even a limited enrichment programme? The reason
is that if you have thousands of centrifuge machines, which they have, then
it will be very easy for them to hide a certain number of these machines in
some of the many military sites.
Q: So it’s hopeless to try to stop Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons?
A: It will certainly be hopeless to continue the cat-and-mouse game
that has been going on for the past three years. The Europeans have put
themselves in a hopeless position with their two agreements with Tehran. In this game, the onus is on
them to find the needle in the haystack. They must find out if Iran is hiding centrifuge machines in
a country three times as big as France. The mullahs have a policy of
“catch me if you can”. The Iranian regime has never come forward and declared
something completely unknown to the IAEA [International Atomic Energy
Agency]. Every single declaration by the Iranian regime has been in response
to revelations by the National Council of Resistance or discoveries by the
IAEA itself. Iran’s declarations are a collection
of denials, changes stories, and belated admissions.
Q: What about the Iranian people? Some commentators say the majority
of Iranians want the Islamic Republic to have nuclear weapons.
A: That’s just buying their propaganda at face value. The vast majority
of Iranians, particularly the educated people and scientists, cannot wait to
see the end of this religious dictatorship. So they see nuclear weapons in
the hands of the mullahs as something that will prolong their rule. That’s
why they don’t want it.
Q: What should be done?
A: If there is a will, there is a way. Stop the concessions and take
the case to the Security Council and make it clear that the world will not
tolerate an Islamic fundamentalist regime and state sponsor of terrorism
armed with nuclear weapons. The mullahs understand the language of force. The
only way to stop them is to make the choice crystal clear to them. At the
moment, they think the West is too divided and irresolute and interested in
trade and oil to act with firmness.
Iran importing extra-durable steel for
nukes – exile group Thu. 28 Jul 2005
PARIS - Iran is violating international
agreements by secretly importing an extra-durable
steel for use in its nuclear program, an exiled Iranian opposition group
Some of the group's past information about Iran's nuclear program has proved
accurate. The Iranian government, which says it has no nuclear weapons
program, routinely refuses to respond to its allegations from the opposition
Thursday, the National Council of Resistance of Iran claimed that front
companies for the Iranian regime were smuggling in maraging
steel, an alloy that withstands high stress and heat and can be used to build
centrifuges for uranium enrichment. It also has applications in regular
"At present, maraging steel is being smuggled
to Iran illegally from other countries,"
Mohammed Mohaddessin, head of the group's foreign
affairs committee, told a news conference in Paris.
The group said it did not know exactly how much of the metal was being
brought into Iran. It alleged that some of it came
from Malaysia and was shipped to the United Arab Emirates before reaching Iran.
The Iranian opposition group said research on maraging
steel was being conducted at Malek Ashtar University in Tehran and at other scientific centers and
that the country was close to producing it.
The group said it had informed the International Atomic Energy Agency, the
U.N. nuclear watchdog agency, of its findings.
Melissa Fleming, a spokeswoman for the Vienna-based agency, said its experts
"will review the claims to see if there's anything to them." She
declined to elaborate.
Maraging steel is on a list of goods to be subject
to export controls because they could be used for nuclear purposes. If Iran is importing maraging
steel, it has a responsibility to disclose it, said Joseph Cirincione of the Carnegie Endowment for International
Should the allegations prove true, Cirincione said,
they show that "Iran is still violating its treaty
obligations, and that the nuclear black market is alive and well, still
supplying these materials to countries that seek them."
The opposition group said Iran was also using maraging steel to build nuclear bomb casings. But Cirincione said that using such a tough
steel for that purpose was unnecessary.
Kopie an :
Auswärtige Angelegenheiten ,
UNHCR Wien ,